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Abstract
Barcelona en Comu´, an emerging grassroots movement-party, won the
2015 Barcelona City Council election. This candidacy was devised by
activists involved in the 15M movement in order to turn citizen outrage
into political change. On the one hand, the 15M movement is based on
a decentralized structure. On the other hand, political science literature
postulates that parties historically develop oligarchical leadership struc-
tures. This tension motivates us to examine whether Barcelona en Comu´
preserved a decentralizated structure or adopted a conventional central-
ized organization. In this article we analyse the Twitter networks of the
parties that ran for this election by measuring their hierarchical struc-
ture, information efficiency and social resilience. Our results show that in
Barcelona en Comu´ two well-defined groups co-exist: a cluster dominated
by the leader and the collective accounts, and another cluster formed by
the movement activists. While the former group is highly centralized like
the other major parties, the latter one stands out for its decentralized,
cohesive and resilient structure.
Keywords: Online Politics, Networked Social Movements, Party Organization
1 Introduction
In the last years a new global wave of citizen protests has emerged: the Arab
Spring, the 15M movement in Spain, Occupy Wall Street, #YoSoy132 in Mexico,
Occupy Gezi in Turkey, the Brazilian movement #VemPraRua, Occupy Central
in Hong Kong, etc. All these movements share common characteristics such as
the claim for new models of democracy, the strategic usage of social media (e.g
Twitter), and the occupation of physical spaces. All of them have encountered
difficulties in modifying the institutional agenda and, hence, the public policies.
The 2015 Barcelona City Council election is one of the first cases in which one
of these movements has got to “occupy” the public institutions by building
Barcelona en Comu´ (BeC), a political party that won the elections. BeC was
conceived as the confluence of (1) minor and/or emerging parties and, to a
large extent, (2) collectives and activists, with no political party affiliation, who
played a prominent role in the 15M movement.
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The 15M movement, also referred to as #SpanishRevolution or the “Indig-
nados” Movement, emerged in May 2011 and has been defined as a “networked
social movement of the digital age” [1]. Networked social movements, like the
Arab Spring, the 15M and Occupy Wall Street, are claimed to be “a network
of networks, they can afford not to have an identifiable centre, and yet ensure
coordination functions, as well as deliberation, by interaction between multiple
nodes” [1]. Other authors have formulated similar hypotheses when defining
this new model of social movement as a “change from logic of collective action,
associated with high levels of organizational resources and the formation of col-
lective identities, to a logic of connective action, based on personalized content
sharing across media networks” [2]. We should note that some voices have re-
fused these theoretical assumptions and argued that “a handful of people control
most of the communication flow” and, consequently, the existence of leaders in
such movements could not be denied [3]. Empirical studies revealed that the
15M network on Twitter is characterised by its “decentralized structure, based
on coalitions of smaller organizations” in spite of “a small core of central users is
still critical to trigger chains of messages of high orders of magnitude” [4]. De-
centralization has been also observed in [5] in which the 15M network is defined
as open and polycentric.
The 15M network properties (i.e. decentralization, openness, polycentrism)
could be perceived as a striking contrast to conventional political organizations,
in particular, political parties. The Iron Law of Oligarchy [6] postulates that
political parties, like any complex organization, self-generate an elite (i.e. “Who
says organization, says oligarchy”). Although some scholars have criticised the
idea that organizations will intrinsically build oligarchical leadership structures
[7, 8, 9], many political and social theorists have supported that, historically,
small minorities hold the most power in political processes [10, 11, 12]. Regard-
ing Spanish politics, a study of the 2011 national election campaign on Twitter
revealed that “minor and new parties tend to be more clustered and better
connected, which implies a more cohesive community” [13]. Nevertheless, all
the difussion networks of parties in that study were strongly centralized around
their candidate and/or party profiles. Later studies analysed the interactions
on Twitter between the 15M nodes and political parties and conclude that net-
worked social movements are para-institutions: perceived as institutions but
preserving an internal networked organization [14]. However, these conclusions
were formulated by analysing the networks when no elections were held, before
institutionalisation began. Election campaigns are competitive processes that
might favor the centralization of an organization around candidates. Indeed, it
has been proved that the network properties of political parties change when
elections arrive [15].
Given that Barcelona en Comu´ emerged from the 15M and this networked
movement is characterised by a decentralized structure, the research question of
this study is the following: Has Barcelona en Comu´ preserved a decentralizated
structure or has it adopted into a conventional centralized organization ruled by
an elite?
Previous hypotheses [16] about Podemos, a member party of the Barcelona
en Comu´ candidacy and also inspired by the 15M movement, postulate an orga-
nization formed by a front-end (“spokesmen/spokeswomen who are visible from
the media perspective”) and a back-end (“muscle of the organization, barely
visible from the media perspective”). Per contra, there are no empirical vali-
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dations of this hypothesis. We strongly believe that the answer to the above
research question will provide relevant insights into the institutionalisation of
these new paradigm of social movements.
Motivated by our research question, we aim to characterise the social struc-
tures of Barcelona en Comu´ by comparing its diffusion network on Twitter to the
ones of the other political parties running for this election. The identification of
the sub-network corresponding to each party is made possible by the highly di-
vided partisan structure of the information diffusion network. This assumption
relies on previous studies of political discussions in social media [17, 18]. Recent
research in data-driven political science has revealed the recurrent existence
of boundaries between ideological online communities, in particular, political
parties. A study of the 2004 U.S. Presidential election depicted a divided blo-
gosphere in which liberals and conservatives barely generated links between the
two communities [17]. Similarly, the network of retweets for the 2010 U.S. con-
gressional midterm elections exhibited a highly segregated partisan structure
where connections between left- and right-leaning users were extremely lim-
ited [18]. Both studies have been taken as relevant empirical validations of the
so-called cyber-balkanization, a social phenomenon that occurs when Internet
users form isolated groups around specific interests, e.g. politics. This concept
is closely related to the idea of echo chambers, in which people are “mainly lis-
tening to louder echoes of their own voices” [19] and, therefore, reinforce division
in social media. Indeed, online polarization is not only a particular feature of
U.S. politics but also a social behaviour observed in a diverse range of countries,
e.g. Canada [20] and Germany [21]. In Spain, previous studies of the Twitter
networks related to recent elections also showed evidence of online polarization,
e.g. in the 2010 Catalan election [22] and in the 2011 Spanish elections [13, 23].
In this study, we first measure the polarization of the network, detect the
online difussion sub-network of each party, and identify the users who build
bridges between these clusters. Then, we analyse the diffusion networks of each
of the detected clusters to characterise the social structure of the corresponding
parties. The analysis of the social structures extenses the framework introduced
in [15] which focuses on three dimensions: hierarchical structure, effective diffu-
sion and social resilience.
2 Data preparation
Here, we describe the construction of the network of retweets and introduce
a data-driven framework to extract the clusters corresponding to the political
parties.
2.1 Network construction
Data were collected from Twitter in relation to the campaign for the 2015
Barcelona City Council election (May 1-26, 2015). We defined a list of Twit-
ter accounts of the seven main political parties: Barcelona en Comu´ (BeC)1,
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barcelona_en_Com%C3%BA
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Table 1: Twitter accounts of the selected political parties and candidates.
Political Party / Coalition Party account(s) Candidate account
BeC
@bcnencomu
@icveuiabcn
@podem bcn
@equobcn
@pconstituentbcn
@adacolau
CiU
@cdcbarcelona
@uniobcn
@xaviertrias
Cs @cs bcna @carinamejias
CUP
@capgirembcn
@cupbarcelona
@mjlecha
ERC @ercbcn @alfredbosch
PP @ppbarcelona @albertofdezxbcn
PSC @pscbarcelona @jaumecollboni
Converge`ncia i Unio´ (CiU)2, Ciudadanos (Cs)3, Capgirem Barcelona (CUP)4,
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya5, Partit Popular de Catalunya (PP)6, and
Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC)7. We also added the Twitter ac-
counts for corresponding candidates for Mayor and each member party for the
coalitions CiU, BeC and CUP. The users of that list can be found in Table 1.
From the Twitter Streaming API, we extracted 373,818 retweets of tweets that
(1) were created by, (2) were retweeted by, or (3) mentioned a user from the
list.
From this collection of retweets, we built a directed weighted graph com-
prising a set of nodes (users) and a set of edges (retweets between any pair of
users). The weight of each edge was the number of retweets from the source
node to the target node. To exclude anecdotal interactions between users and
highlight the structure of the expected clusters, we only kept the interactions
between any pair of nodes that occurred at least 3 times: an edge from user A
to user B implied that user A has retweeted at least three times user B in our
dataset. Nodes without edges after this process were removed. The resulting
network comprises 6,492 nodes and 16,775 edges.
2.2 Community detection
Traditionally, community detection is performed by applying a clustering algo-
rithm. We chose the Louvain method [24] which is commonly used because of its
high performance in terms of efficiency and accuracy. Like many clustering al-
gorithms, however, this method results into problems when defining boundaries
between clusters: it assigns each node to one cluster, and also nodes that do not
strongly belong to any cluster are assigned to one. The algorithm’s outcome
depends on the particular execution that is considered. This means that a node
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_and_Union
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citizens_(Spanish_political_party)
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popular_Unity_Candidates
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republican_Left_of_Catalonia
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Party_of_Catalonia
7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialists%27_Party_of_Catalonia
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that appears to belong to a certain cluster could fall in another cluster if we run
the algorithm another time. To solve this issue, we have designed an adapted
version of the Louvain method: the algorithm is executed several times, and
only the nodes that fall into the same cluster during the large majority of these
executions are assigned to it.
We first executed the standard Louvain method and found 151 clusters and
achieved a modularity value of 0.727. From Figure S1 in Supporting Information
Section we observed a clear difference between the 8 largest clusters (size ∈
[232, 1981]) and the remaining 143 clusters (size ∈ [2, 62]). In order to label
these 8 clusters, we manually inspected the most relevant users from each cluster
according to their PageRank value within the full network (the top five users
for each cluster are listed in Table 2). The results indicate that the community
detection method identified a single cluster for almost each party: BeC = c1, c4;
ERC = c2; CUP = c3; Cs = c5; CiU = c6; PP = c7 and PSC = c8. The only
exception for such rule is that BeC is composed of two clusters. The manual
inspection of the users from these two clusters revealed that cluster c1 is formed
by the official accounts of the party (e.g. @bcnencomu, @ahorapodemos), allied
parties (e.g. @ahoramadrid), the candidate (@adacolau) and a large community
of peripheral users. Cluster c4 is composed of activists engaged in the digital
communication for the campaign (e.g. @toret, @santidemajo, @galapita). That
is to say that the most visible accounts from the media perspective belong to
c1 while c4 is formed by party activists, many of them related to the 15M
movement. For this reason, from now on, we distinguish these clusters as “BeC-
p” and “BeC-m”, party and movement respectively.
Furthermore, we found a remarkable presence of accounts related to media
in Table 2 for almost every cluster. As we noted above, we aim to study the
ecosystem of each political party, i.e including only nodes that are reliably as-
signed to them. To this end, we applied the adapted version of the Louvain
method that is described in Section S2.1.2: we ran the algorithm 100 times and
assigned to each cluster only the nodes that fell into that cluster more than 95
times. By inspecting the results of the 100 executions, we found the presence of
8 major clusters, much bigger than the others, as a constant element. The com-
position of these clusters is also quite stable: 4,973 nodes (82.25%) are assigned
to the same cluster in over 95 executions.
Among the remaining nodes, which could not be reliably assigned to any
of the major clusters, we find that many accounts are media. We additionally
identified the most relevant users, according to PageRank, in the sub-network
formed only by edges between nodes from different clusters (i.e. “weak ties”
[25]). Table S1 presents the 25 most relevant users in this sub-network and
confirms that media played a key role in connecting different clusters.
3 Results
So far we have described the way diffussion network was constructed and the
ways it was divided into cluster corresponding to major political parties. For
the next steps we focus on polarization of the network during the campaign and
compare structural peculiarities of the largest clusters in the following dimen-
sions: hierarchical structure, effective difussion, and social resilience.
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Table 2: Top 5 users for the 8 largest clusters according to their PageRank value
within the full network (clusters are ordered by size).
Cluster id Cluster label User PageRank Role
c1 BeC-p @bcnencomu 0.092 BeC party account
c1 BeC-p @adacolau 0.029 BeC candidate
c1 BeC-p @ahoramadrid 0.009 BeC allied party account
c1 BeC-p @ahorapodemos 0.009 BeC member party account
c1 BeC-p @elperiodico 0.005 media
c2 ERC @ercbcn 0.016 ERC party account
c2 ERC @alfredbosch 0.011 ERC candidate
c2 ERC @naciodigital 0.009 media
c2 ERC @arapolitica 0.007 media
c2 ERC @esquerra erc 0.004 ERC party account
c3 CUP @cupbarcelona 0.016 CUP party account
c3 CUP @capgirembcn 0.008 CUP party account
c3 CUP @albertmartnez 0.005 media
c3 CUP @encampanya 0.003 media
c3 CUP @mjlecha 0.002 CUP candidate
c4 BeC-m @toret 0.014 BeC member
c4 BeC-m @santidemajo 0.005 BeC member
c4 BeC-m @sentitcritic 0.005 media
c4 BeC-m @galapita 0.005 BeC member
c4 BeC-m @eloibadia 0.005 BeC member
c5 Cs @carinamejias 0.007 Cs candidate
c5 Cs @cs bcna 0.006 Cs party account
c5 Cs @ciudadanoscs 0.004 Cs party account
c5 Cs @soniasi02 0.003 Cs member
c5 Cs @prensacs 0.002 media
c6 CiU @xaviertrias 0.012 CiU candidate
c6 CiU @ciu 0.004 CiU party account
c6 CiU @bcn ajuntament 0.003 institutional
c6 CiU @ramontremosa 0.002 CiU member
c6 CiU @cdcbarcelona 0.002 CiU party account
c7 PP @btvnoticies 0.011 media
c7 PP @cati bcn 0.003 media
c7 PP @albertofdezxbcn 0.003 PP candidate
c7 PP @maticatradio 0.002 media
c7 PP @ppbarcelona 0.002 PP party account
c8 PSC @elsmatins 0.006 media
c8 PSC @pscbarcelona 0.003 PSC party account
c8 PSC @sergifor 0.003 media
c8 PSC @jaumecollboni 0.002 PSC candidate
c8 PSC @elpaiscat 0.002 media
3.1 Polarization
Similar to the previous findings for online political networks we detected a high
level of polarization when calculated modularity (Q = 0.727) for the first execu-
tion of standard Louvain method as described before. The boundaries between
ideological online communities are visible in Figure 1, where we visualized the
resulting graph partitioning for N = 100 and ε = 0.05. For a better readabil-
6
ity of the network, we only considered the giant component of the graph and
applied the Force Atlas 2 layout algorithm [26] to enforce cluster graph drawing.
As one could expected in any polarized scenario, the largest number of inter-
action links happened within the same cluster. There were however a notably
large number of links between the two clusters of BeC (BeC-p and BeC-m). To
further prove the low levels of interactions between major parties we made an
interaction matrix A, where Ai,j counts all retweets that accounts assigned to
cluster i made for the tweets from users of cluster j. Since the clusters are of
the different size, we then normalized Ai,j ’s by the sum of the all retweets made
by the users assigned to cluster i. From Figure 2, where we draw matrix A, we
confirmed that a vast majority of retweets were made between users from the
same cluster (main diagonal). For Barcelona en Comu´ we found a presence of
communication between movement and party clusters with a prevalence from
BeC-m to BeC-p (0.18, the largest value out of the main diagonal).
3.2 Structure of the party clusters
Inspired by the framework introduced in [15] we proposed to compare the topol-
ogy of the intra-network of each cluster in terms of hierarchical structure, infor-
mation efficiency, and social resilience.
3.2.1 Hierarchical structure
To evaluate the hierarchical structure we measured the in-degree inequality of
each cluster based on the Gini coefficient. We also calculated in-degree cen-
tralization suggested in [15], however found it uninformative in the case of high
variability of the data.
From results in Table 3 we saw a notable divergence between these hierarchi-
cal metrics: the inequality values of CiU and PP are similar (Gin = 0.893 and
Gin = 0.876, respectively), but PP centralization (Cin = 0.378) is far from the
maximum centralization value exhibited by CiU (Cin = 0.770). For Barcelona
en Comu´, BeC-m emerges as the least inequal and the least centralized struc-
ture, while BeC-p forms the most inequal cluster (Gin = 0.995). We also plotted
the Lorenz curve of the in-degree distribution of the clusters in Figure 3 to visu-
ally validate the different levels of inequality among clusters that were presented
in Table 3.
It is easy to demonstrate that for networks with a heavy tailed in-degree
distribution (as the ones of this study) the in-degree centralization formulated
in [27] is approximately equal to the ratio between the maximum in-degree and
the number of nodes8. Therefore, this metric is not a good one to capture
hierarchical structure for social diffusion graphs, and Gini coefficient for in-
degree inequality represents a more reliable measure.
3.2.2 Information efficiency
Broadly speaking the efficiency of a network aims to measure its small-world
property, i.e. phenomenon of strangers being linked by a mutual acquaintance.
To assess the efficiency of information transportation within each party cluster
8 This is caused by the differences of several orders of magnitude between the maximum
and average in-degree, common situation for social graphs.
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Figure 1: Network of retweets (giant component). Clusters are represented by
color: BeC-p in dark green; BeC-m in light green; ERCin yellow; PSC in red;
CUP in violet; Cs in orange; CiU in dark blue; PP in cyan. The nodes out of
these clusters are grey-colored.
8
Figure 2: Normalized weighted adjacency matrix of the network of clusters.
Figure 3: Lorenz curve of the in-degree distribution of each cluster.
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Table 3: Inequality based on the Gini Coefficient (Gin) and centralization (Cin)
of the in-degree distribution of each cluster.
Cluster Gin Cin
BeC-p 0.995 0.639
Cs 0.964 0.476
ERC 0.954 0.452
CUP 0.953 0.635
CiU 0.893 0.770
PP 0.876 0.378
PSC 0.818 0.565
BeC-m 0.811 0.290
Table 4: Number of nodes (N) and edges (E), clustering coefficient (Cl) and
average path length (l) of the intra-network of each cluster.
Cluster N E Cl l
BeC-m 427 2 431 0.208 3.35
PP 301 1 163 0.188 2.73
PSC 211 810 0.182 2.29
CiU 337 1 003 0.114 4.66
Cs 352 832 0.073 2.57
CUP 635 1 422 0.037 2.57
ERC 866 1 899 0.027 5.43
BeC-p 1 844 2 427 0.002 2.48
we computed the average path length and the clustering coefficient. Small-world
networks tend to have a small average shortest path length and a clustering
coefficient significantly higher than expected by random chance [28].
From Table 4 we observe that BeC-m has the highest clustering coefficient
(Cl = 0.208) closely followed by PP and PSC, the two smallest clusters by size.
On the contrary the clustering coefficient of BeC-p is almost 0. This finding
could be explained by the topology of BeC-p, roughly formed by stars whose
center nodes are the most visible Twitter accounts of Barcelona en Comu´: the
party official accounts and the candidate.
We do not observe a remarkable pattern regarding the average path length.
It is lower than 3 for the majority of the party clusters with the PSC cluster
having the lowest value (l = 2.29). In the same time ERC, CiU and BeC-m
expose the longest average path length (5.43, 4.66, 3.35 respectively).
3.2.3 Social resilience
The concept of social resilience is the ability of a social group to withstand
external stresses. To measure social resilience for a social network we applied
the k-core decomposition for each cluster and evaluated the distributions of the
nodes within each k-core.
In Table 5 we present maximal and average k-indexes for each cluster and
Figure 4 visually shows the corresponding distributions. As in the case of hierar-
chical structure and information efficiency we observed a remarkable difference
between BeC-m (kmax = 17, kavg = 5.90) and BeC-p (kmax = 5, kavg = 1.33),
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Table 5: Maximal and average k-index (standard deviation in parentheses) for
the intra-network of each cluster.
cluster kmax kavg
BeC-m 17 5.90 (5.46)
PP 12 4.02 (3.99)
PSC 11 3.85 (3.55)
CiU 13 3.10 (3.44)
ERC 8 2.25 (1.85)
Cs 10 2.42 (2.42)
CUP 10 2.19 (2.22)
BeC-p 5 1.33 (0.71)
that are the highest and lowest values respectively. In comparison to the other
parties we saw clear differences between node distributions for both, BeC-m and
BeC-p, and the rest (the largest concentration of the nodes is in the first k-cores
and considerable part is in the inner most cores). Therefore, the movement
group of Barcelona en Comu´ is an online social community with an extreme
ability to withstand or recover. In the same time the party group of Barcelona
en Comu´ seems to only focus on the core users.
Figure 4: Distribution of the nodes per cluster (column) and k-index (row).
Cells are colored to form a heat map indicating the density (log scale).
4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the results from examining the structures on Twitter
of the political parties in the 2015 Barcelona City Council election.
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4.1 Institutionalisation of a networked movement
Our research question deals with the kind of organizational structure that
Barcelona en Comu´ developed for the campaign. On the one hand, the cited
literature [4, 5] provided evidence of the decentralization of the 15M movement,
which inspired the Barcelona en Comu´ candidacy. On the other hand, many po-
litical scientists [6, 10, 11, 12] argued that parties are always ruled by elites and,
therefore, result in centralized organizations. Furthermore, the historical models
of political parties reviewed in [29] (i.e. Caucus parties, Mass parties, Catch-all
parties, and Cartel parties) always assumed organization around elites. All of
these observations motivated us to study whether Barcelona en Comu´ preserved
a decentralizated structure or adopted a conventional centralized organization.
Our results depict a movement-parrty structure in which the two components
form well-defined clusters. In comparison to the clusters of the rest of politi-
cal parties, we found the BeC movement community as the least hierarchichal,
better clustered and most resilient one. In contrast, the BeC party community
emerges as the most hierarchical, least clustered and least resilient one. The
centralization of the party cluster points to the candidate and official accounts,
the subjects that are commonly associated with the elite. However, unlike the
rest of political parties, there is a co-existence of both party and movement clus-
ters. This co-existence is consistent with the hypothesis expressed in [16] when
defining Podemos, member party of Barcelona en Comu´, as the conjugation of
a front-end and a back-end.
In this article we have characterised the organization of political parties ac-
cording to their online diffusion networks. Some authors have reported that the
Internet played a key role in the organization of the 15M movement for building
“a hybrid space between the Internet social networks and the occupied urban
space” [1]. According to [5], this hybrid space is the result of technopolitical prac-
tices: “the tactical and strategic use of technological devices (including social
networks) for organization, communication and collective action”. Are tech-
nopolitics the origin of this particular movement-party partition of Barcelona
en Comu´? Recently, political scientists have postulated the emergence of cyber
parties “with its origins in developments in media and information and com-
munication technologies” [30]. Although we can not ensure that the Internet is
the only reason behind this new form of political organization, in this particular
context some party activists reported that ICT technologies becomes essential
for campaigning [31]. Therefore, we are convinced of the close link between
technopolitics and the structure of Barcelona en Comu´.
4.2 Online polarization
The identification of the different clusters was made possible by the high level
of polarization that the network exhibited, as we initially expected. We ob-
served that bridges between clusters (i.e. “weak ties” [25]) were mostly built
by accounts related to media. Because media accounts hardly retweet content
from other accounts, a great amount of weak ties consists of users from politi-
cal clusters retweeting content published by media accounts. This means that
media play a key role in generating messages that build a public sphere. Some
theorists suggest that the best response to group polarization is the usage of
“mechanisms providing a public sphere” [32]. We found that the most relevant
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account in the sub-network of weak ties was @btvnoticies, the local and pub-
licly owned television. Indeed, this TV channel organized the debate among the
candidates of five of the seven parties. Figure S2 presents the ego-networks of
four media accounts: @btvnoticies, @arapolitica @elpaiscat and @naciodigital.
We clearly observe that @btvnoticies is linked from every party while the other
3 private media are only linked from specific clusters. This finding might indi-
cate that public TV became more plural than the other three analysed private
media, and pluralism is an effective tool to get “people exposed to a range of
reasonable competing views” [32].
5 Conclusions
In this study we have examined the Twitter networks of Barcelona en Comu´ in
comparison to the other parties for the 2015 Barcelona municipal elections. We
observed that the tension between the decentralization of networked movements
and the centralization of traditional political parties results into a movement-
party structure: the two paradigms co-exist in two well-defined clusters. From
this result, we find of interest to further investigate the origin of this partic-
ular structure: (1) Did the structure of Barcelona en Comu´ result from the
confluence of minor parties and the 15M activists? Or (2) instead of evolving
into a centralized organization, did the 15M networked movement implement a
party interface over its decentralized structure? Further longitudinal analyses
of the formation of these networks could help us to provide answer to these open
questions.
It is interesting to note that city council elections were held in every Spanish
city in May 2015 and candidacies similar to Barcelona en Comu´ were built.
Moreover, after these elections, the city councils of several of the largest Spanish
cities are ruled by these new organizations (e.g. Ahora Madrid, Zaragoza en
Comu´n). For this reason, future work should replicate this analysis to examine
whether the characteristics that we observed in Barcelona en Comu´ are also
present in these other grassroots movement-parties.
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S1 Supporting Information
The supportive figures and tables of this article are presented below.
Figure S1: Distribution of the number of clusters (c) by size (s). Red markers
are used to indicate the 8 largest clusters.
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Figure S2: Ego-networks of 4 media accounts: a) @btvnoticies; b) @arapolit-
ica; c) @elpaiscat ; d) @naciodigital. Central nodes (i.e. corresponding media
accounts) are black-colored.
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Table S1: Most relevant nodes by PageRank in the sub-network formed by edges
between nodes from different clusters.
User Page Rank Role
@btvnoticies 0.014 media
@bcnencomu 0.012 party
@sicomtelevision 0.010 media
@cupbarcelona 0.007 party
@elsmatins 0.007 media
@capgirembcn 0.006 party
@tv3cat 0.006 media
@324cat 0.006 media
@xaviertrias 0.005 candidate
@puntcattv3 0.005 media
@revolucio1984 0.004 citizen
@sergifor 0.004 media
@nuriapujadas 0.004 media
@annatorrasfont 0.004 media
@arapolitica 0.004 media
@maticatradio 0.003 media
@cati bcn 0.003 media
@elpaiscat 0.003 media
@encampanya 0.003 media
@albertmartnez 0.002 media
@naciodigital 0.002 media
@adacolau 0.002 candidate
@ramontremosa 0.002 party member
@alfredbosch 0.002 candidate
@directe 0.001 media
S2 Methods
In this study we have used methods of social network analysis for community
detection, identification of relevant nodes, and measurement of the topological
structure of a network.
S2.1 Community detection
S2.1.1 Modularity
The modularity measures the density of edges inside communities in comparison
to edges between communities [33]. Its value, between -1 and 1, is defined as:
Q =
1
2m
Σij
[
Aij − kikj
2m
]
δ(ci, cj).
Here Aij is the edge weight between nodes i and j; ki and kj are the degrees
of the nodes i and j, respectively; m represents the total number of edges in
the graph. ci; and cj are the communities of the nodes and δ is a simple delta
function.
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S2.1.2 Louvain Method
The Louvain Method is a community detection technique based on a greedy
algorithm that attempts to optimize the modularity of a partition of a given
network [24]. The method follows a two-step approach.
First, each node is assigned to its own community. Then, for each node i,
the change in modularity is measured for moving i from its own community into
the community of each neighbor j:
∆Q =
[
Σin + ki,in
2m
−
(
Σtot + ki
2m
)2]
−
[
Σin
2m
−
(
Σtot
2m
)2
−
(
ki
2m
)2]
,
where Σin is sum of all the weights of the intra-edges of the community where
i being moved into, Σtot is the sum of all the weights of the edges to nodes of
the community, ki is the degree of i, ki,in is the sum of the weights of the edges
between i and other nodes in the community, and m is the sum of the weights of
all edges in the network. Once this value is measured for all communities that
i is connected to, the algorithm locates i into the community that produces
the largest increase in modularity. If no increase is possible, i remains in its
original community. This process is applied iteratively until modularity can not
be increase and a local maximum of modularity is achieved.
In the second step, the method groups all of the nodes from the same com-
munity and builds a new network where nodes are the communities from the
previous step. Edges between nodes of the same community are represented by
self-loops and edges from multiple nodes from the same community to a node of
a different community are represented by weighted edges between corresponding
communities.
First and second steps are repeated until modularity can not be increased.
Adapted version to enhance the robustness of the largest clusters
Like most community detection methods, the Louvain method consists of a
greedy algorithm and has a random component, so each execution produces a
different result. To obtain robust results, avoiding dependency on a particular
execution of the algorithm, we introduce the following method to identify the
main clusters of the network in a stable way.
First, we run N executions of the Louvain algorithm, which produce N differ-
ent partitions of the network into clusters. Then we select the bigger clusters for
each partition, and identify each cluster through its most representative nodes.
In particular, as we expect that the main clusters will represent the political
parties, we identify each cluster with the most central node corresponding to
the account of a political party or of a political party leader. Finally, we assign
to each cluster all the nodes that appear in that cluster in at least the 1− ε of
the partitions created, where 1− ε represents the confidence interval.
This procedure allows us to validate the results of the community detection
algorithm, and to guarantee that all the nodes that are assigned to a cluster do
actually belong to it with high confidence. The remaining nodes, that cannot
be assigned in a stable way to any of the main clusters, are left out from all the
clusters.
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S2.2 Identification of relevant nodes: PageRank
PageRank is a global characteristic of a node participation in some network and
could be seen as a characteristic of node’s success and popularity [34]. It is
defined as a stationary distribution of a random walk on the directed graph.
At each step, with probability c, the random walk follows a randomly chosen
outgoing edge from a node, and with probability (1− c) the walk starts afresh
from a node chosen uniformly among all nodes. The constant c is called damping
factor, and takes values between 0 and 1 (traditionally c=0.85). PageRank can
be summarized in the following formula:
PR(i) = c
∑
j→i
1
dj
PR(j) +
1− c
n
,
where PR(i) is the PageRank of node i, dj is out-degree of node j, the sum
is taken over all nodes j that link to node i, and n is the number of nodes
in the network. Unlike in- and out-degree which are local characteristics, the
PageRank is a global characteristic of a node. In other words, adding/removing
an edge between two nodes could affect PageRank values of many nodes.
S2.3 Network topology
S2.3.1 In-degree distribution
The in-degree of node i is the total number of edges onto node i. By counting
how many nodes have each in-degree value, the in-degree distribution P (kin)
is equal to the fraction of nodes in the graph with such in-degree kin. The
cumulative in-degree distribution P (K ≥ kin) represents the fraction of nodes
in the graph whose in-degree is greater than or equal to kin.
S2.3.2 In-degree Centralization
A existing method to measure degree centralization was introduced by [27] and
is based on two concepts: (1) how the centrality of the most central node exceeds
the centrality of all other nodes and (2) setting the value as a ratio by comparing
to a star network:
Cin =
n∑
i=1
[kin∗ − kini ]
max
n∑
i=1
[kin∗ − kini ]
,
where kini is the in-degree of node i, k
in
∗ is the maximum in-degree of the
network and max
n∑
i=1
[kin∗ − kini ] is the maximum possible sum of differences for
a graph with the same number of nodes (a star network).
S2.3.3 In-degree Inequality: Gini coefficient
The Gini coefficient is a statistical metric to quantify the level of inequality
given a distribution [35]. It was initially formulated in Economics to measure
the income distribution by using the Lorenz curve. If A is the area between the
line corresponding perfect equality and B is the area under the Lorenz curve,
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the Gini coefficient is equal to A/(A + B). If the Lorenz curve is expressed by
the function Y = L(X), B is calculated as follows:
G = 1− 2
∫ 1
0
L(X)dX
In the context of network topology, the Gini coefficient can be applied to char-
acterize the hierarchical structure of a network based on the inequality of its
in-degree distribution.
S2.3.4 Clustering coefficient
Clustering coefficient measures the extent of nodes to clusted together by calcu-
lating the number of triangles in the network. For every node i we set Ni to be
the neighborhood, i.e. Nj = {j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E}, and define the local clustering
coefficient as
Cli =
2|(j, k) ∈ E : j, k ∈ Nj |
ki(ki − 1) .
Then, following [28] the clustering coefficient is just the average of the local
clustering coefficients: Cl =
∑
i Cli/n, where n is the number of nodes in the
network.
S2.3.5 Average path length
The concept of average path length aims to measure the efficiency of information
propagation in a social network by taking the mean value of the number of edges
along the shortest paths for all possible pairs of nodes. In more details, for every
pair of nodes i, j we set dij to be the smallest number of steps among all directed
paths between i and j and dij = 0 if there is no such path. Then, the average
path length is defined as follows: l =
∑
i 6=j dij/n(n− 1).
S2.3.6 k-core decomposition
The k-core of a graph is the maximal subgraph in which each vertex is adjacent,
ignoring the direction of the edge, to at least k other nodes of the subgraph. A
graph’s node has a k-index equals to k if it belongs to the k-core but not to the
(k+1)-core. Thus, a given network, we define a sub-network H induced by the
subset of users C. H is a k-core of the network if and only if for every user in
C: degH(i) ≤ k , and H is the maximum sub-graph which fulfils this condition.
With degH(i) we denote the degree of the node i in the sub-graph H. A user
has k-index equal k if it belongs to the k-core but not to the (k+1)-core.
In simple words, k-core decomposition starts with k = 1 and removes all
nodes with degree equal to 1. The procedure is repeated iteratively until no
vertices with degree 1 remain. Next, all removed nodes are assigned k-index
to be 1. It continues with the same procedure for k = 2 and obtains vertices
with indexes equal 2, and so on. The process stops when the last node from the
network is removed at the kmax
th step. The variable kmax is then the maximum
shell index of the graph.
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